Mongolia’s New Identity and Security Dilemmas by Batbayar, Tsedendamba
3
 Number 8-9, 2002The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
MONGOLIA’S NEW IDENTITY AND
SECURITY DILEMMAS
Tsedendamba Batbayar (Mongolia)
The Future of Mongolia: Central Asian Identity versus Northeast Asian
Mongolia “of which the world knows less than
It knows Siberia, or Manchukuo” provides
“The key to the destiny of the whole Far East”.
Owen Lattimore, 1934.
D. Byambasuren, former Prime Minister of Mongolia (1990-1992), noted
that Mongolia is ‘coated at the crossroads of three great civilizations: Christian
Russia to the north, Confucian China to the south, and Muslim Central Asia in
the west. From the standpoint of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations,
Mongolia is at the vortex of major historical forces. Its location also bestows on
Mongolia the potential for building bridges among these great civilizations.
After the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), Mongolia’s role as a link of stabil-
ity between Central and Northeast Asia became more pronounced. Mongolia
joined the global coalition against terrorism without any reservation and offered
its readiness to contribute to the global fight against terrorism in any possible
way.1
By the early 1990s Mongolians vigorously debated to which region their
country belonged. This was not merely an academic question but had implica-
tions for Mongolia’s survival as a sovereign state. During the Cold war period,
Mongolia solidly belonged to the Soviet-led security system that stretched
from its southern Gobi borders all the way to the Berlin Wall. Although Mongolia
was physically situated in Asia, its political and economic, trade relations were
1Mr. Enkhbayar met US President George Bush at the United Nations on Sunday (Nov
11, 2001) after Mr. Bush made his speech at the UN General Assembly. The meeting is
reported to have lasted twice as long as planned. According to a statement from Mongolian
government’s press office, Mr. Bush expressed deep gratitude for Mongolia’s support after
the September 11 terrorist attacks. The statement quoted Mr. Bush as appreciating Mongolia’s
successful venture in establishing democratic institutions and market economy structures
and as saying that he is delighted to see Mongolia being governed by young leaders. Mr.
Enkhbayar, for his part, said Mongolia had chosen the path of democracy and that there
would be no going back on this goal, according to the statement. Mr. Bush is reported to
have concluded the discussions by stressing that “Mongolia is our valued partner and we
should support each other.” Cited from Mongolia This Week, 13 November, 2001.
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tied to the Warsaw Pact countries. The USSR provided important security as-
surances toward its client states, including military security toward Mongolia.
Now that the USSR has disappeared and Mongolia abandoned by its
long-term patron, Mongolia’s ruling elite was confronted with the question:
who can be our best friends and whom we can trust? To the south of Mongolia,
there was the one billion, three hundred million population of China with a
dynamic growing market economy but still under strict control of the Commu-
nist party. To the north, there was a newly emerged Russia thrown into political,
economic, constitutional and federal turmoil with few signs when it will end. To
the west, there was Serenity Aziya, (Middle Asia) - a Russian term to distinguish
the “Stands” from the rest of Central Asia - newly independent countries with
little experience or vision what to do with newly acquired status as sovereign
states.
Some Mongols preferred that Mongolia belong to Central Asia geographi-
cally, historically, and culturally. Publicist B. Baabar, for example, advocated for
the creation of “The Central Asian Security Zone”, in which Mongolia can be an
active participant along with Turkey. He argued that “throughout their history,
the Mongols had been leaders of Turkic nations, and both Mongolia and
Turkey have set examples as independent states for other nations in the region
to emulate.” In his opinion, political Central Asia included five new republics
and plus Mongolia, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. Baabar considered that Ger-
many and Japan can be important allies of Mongolia in the new Central Asia. In
case of Germany, Mongolia is attractive because it maintained a substantive
network of relations with East Germany and has a comparatively democratic
political regime unlike other Central Asian countries. For him, Mongolia is the
only ally that Japan has in the Central Asian region and is a convenient route for
penetrating the markets of Eastern Siberia and Northern China.2
Since the mid-1990s the Central Asian states (except Tajikistan which was
still embroiled in civil war) have actively sought to diversify their security rela-
tions and form new partnerships outside the context of the CIS or bilateral
agreements with Russia. Through reducing their former dependence on Russia
it became easier for the Central Asian leaders to assert distinct foreign policies
and national security priorities. This has been reflected in the growing engage-
ment in Central Asia of other regional powers - Turkey, Iran and China - as well
as the United States and other Western states. The prospects of exploiting the
2 Baabar B., the Central Asian Security Zone, the Mongolian Journal of International
Ajfairs,Ho2, 1995, pp. 18-32.
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rich oil and gas resources in the Caspian region have attracted not only Western
but also Asian investors and governments.
Mongolia’s dilemma between Central Asia and Northeast Asia had not
only the civilization aspect but more importantly it has a clear-cut developmen-
tal aspect. This choice implicitly concerns the struggle between the nomadic
identities of Mongols vs. its road to modern twenty-first century. It also con-
cerns the vital question of sources for necessary technology and know-how in
order not only to overcome the transition period but also to make the country
self-sustainable and competitive in coming years and decades. Finally are the
calculations from the standpoint of national security. What alliances and align-
ments will best serve Mongolia’s national interests?
In this regard, many argue that Northeast Asia is the preferred choice for
alignment. In the opinion of experienced diplomat Kh. Olzvoy, Mongolia should
not align itself with Central Asian countries because they comprised another
landlocked area and thus could hardly provide much help to Mongolia - a coun-
try which was trying to overcome its own landlocked predicament. In addition,
all Central Asian countries had just recently become independent and thus
lacked the degree of international experience Mongolia required. Third, the po-
litical and strategic situation in Central Asia was far from stabilized. Fourth, the
Central Asian economies continued to be closely intertwined with that of Rus-
sia; finally, the infrastructure in Central Asia was as poorly developed as in
Mongolia.3
In addition to above-mentioned factors, there was another, more funda-
mental, difference between new Central Asian states and Mongolia. Mongolia
had formal attributes of a sovereign state since ever 1924 and was a member of
the UN since 1961. Mongolia had a well-established Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and was an active member in several dozen international organizations. How-
ever, the Central Asian states had to reinvent every symbol of statehood includ-
ing flag, anthem, and constitution. They experienced a great shortage of diplo-
matic cadres and diplomatic skills, which led to a certain naiveté, bordering at
times on euphoria, in their first foreign policy efforts. If Mongolia acquired its de
facto independence because of the Soviet break-up, the Central Asian states
acquired their de jury independence, with practically no foundation in real sov-
ereignty.
3 Olzvoy Kh., A Mongol’s view of economic development and cooperation in Northeast
Asia, The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs,No 3, 1996, pp. 65-66.
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Why align with Northeast Asia? Mongolian authors argued that it would
be much more to Mongolia’s advantage to align itself with the Northeast Asian
countries and provinces. They justified it by a number of arguments. It is widely
expected that the Asia-Pacific region, of which Northeast Asia is an important
part, will become extraordinarily important in the next century. In addition,
Mongolia will come strategically under the economic “umbrella” of technologi-
cally advanced countries like Japan, South Korea, and the United States; it will
have improved relations with the Russian Far East and China’s Northeast as well
as with North Korea; Mongolia’s eastern part, where many of the country’s
mineral resources are located, can be made readily accessible to the rest of
Northeast Asia by road and railway, thus giving Mongolia another access to the
sea, perhaps through Tumen; and it will give Mongolia the opportunity to serve
as a land bridge between Northeast Asia and Europe.4
Another persuasive reason to establish close links with Northeast Asia is
national security. The choices available to Mongolia in international relations
are limited. Landlocked, large in area, and small in population, Mongolia has
been dependent on either China or Russia. On a wide range of political, histori-
cal and strategic issues, Mongolia has watched both neighbors’ policies with
apprehension. The USSR break-up triggered a new stage of security concerns
for Mongolia, which had viewed the world through the lens of the Sino-Soviet
relationship. Now Mongolia looks positively on a new role in the context of
Northeast Asia, which can be the bridge to the larger world, and broaden the
country’s opportunities for security cooperation.
The Concept of Mongolia’s Foreign Policy, endorsed by the Parliament in
1994, outlined six foreign policy priorities for Mongolia in the post-Soviet era.
The third priority dealt with regional aspects of Mongolian foreign policy. It
emerged as a product of compromise between advocates of Central Asian iden-
tity versus those who argued for Northeast Asian regional identity. The Con-
cept stated that “the third direction of Mongolia’s foreign policy activity shall
be strengthening its position in Asia and securing a constructive participation
in the political and economic integration process in the region. Within the frame-
work of this objective, greater attention shall be given to Asia and the Pacific
region, in particular to Northeast and Central Asia. Mongolia shall take an active
part in the process of initiating dialogues and negotiations on the issues of
strengthening regional security and creating a collective security mechanism. It
4 Ibid. p. 66.
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will strive to become a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum
(APEC).” 5
Mongolia joined the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 1998 and it consti-
tutes a remarkable achievement of the active policy in the Asia Pacific region.
The process presents an institutional channel that will enhance Mongolia’s ties
with the region, an opportunity to become an integral part of the strategic
commu-nity and increase the number of friends in the region.
The Future of Mongolia: Neighbors versus a Third Power
“Remember the words of Napoleon: each
State follows the politics of its   geography “.
Francois Mitterrand, French President, 1989.
What is geopolitical vision? How much can it be separated from the dis-
cussion of national identity? How much does it relate to the “policy belief sys-
tem” studied by foreign policy analysts? These questions have particular mean-
ing for Mongolia.
Gertjan Dijkink defined geopolitical vision as “any idea concerning the
relation between one’s own and other places, involving feelings of (insecurity
or (dies) advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission or
foreign policy strategy.” In his opinion, a geopolitical vision requires at least an
us and them distinction and emotional attachment to a particular place.6
Geopolitical visions may be described as just a subset within the foreign
policy belief-system. It is usually described as an “all-encompassing set of
lenses through which decision makers perceive their environment”.7 Geopoliti-
cal visions may consist of volatile conceptions of international relations or be
conceived as core-beliefs with even deeper roots then those dug out in the
usual analysis of foreign policy beliefs, which often relies on well-articulated
policy options and easily verbalized visions.
Anthony Smith has listed several features of national identity: an historic
territory, common myths and historic memories, a mass culture, a common
5 The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, No 2, 1995, p. 73.
6 Gertjan Dijkink, National Identity and Geopolitical Visions, Routlege: London and
New York, 1996, p. 11
7 O.R. Holsti, “The belief system and national images: a case study”, Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 1962, vol. 6, pp. 244-52, and D. Lowenthal, “Geography, experience and
imagination: towards a geographical epistemology”, Annals of the Association of Ameri-
can Geographers, 1961, vol. 51, pp. 241-60
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economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.8 The “historic
territory” implies a narrative of conquest, defense, liberation and loss in which
again certain “Others “ play a role. National identity can hardly be imagined
without the feelings of trauma and pride that arise from external relations. In this
respect feelings of national identity and geopolitical visions are difficult to sepa-
rate.
In 1991, right after the democratic reform began in Mongolia; the promi-
nent Mongolian historian Ch. Dalai published an article titled “Don’t forget the
fact that we have only two big neighbors”. He emphasized: “But the two years
of 1260 and 1691 are the historical years when Mongolian independence was
sold, and it is of no use to try to rehabilitate them. If attempts were made to
rehabilitate them, then it would be against the heroic Mongolian rightful
state. “9 The two dates he mentioned, are closely connected with trauma and
pride in Mongolian external history. In 1260, Khubilai Khan moved the capital of
the Mongol empire from Karakorum to Shandu in China, and thus, according to
Professor Dalai, transferring the heart of the Mongol empire from Mongolia
proper to China. In 1691, the Khalkha Mongolia submitted to the Manchus, thus
opening more than 200 years of Qing dynasty domination of Mongolia.
His remarks reflect the deep-rooted feelings of the Mongolian elite that
Mongolia is “sandwiched” between two giants, namely, Russia and China. The
constant struggle to come out from this “trapped”, “hopeless” vicious circle
dominates the whole twentieth century history of Mongolia. A Western histo-
rian calls the situation as “between the hammer and anvil?”10
A Mongolian historian called his own country as “A puppet republic “
whose fate was manipulated by its neighbors for most of the twentieth cen-
tury.11 This strand of political realism, a notion of “geographical determinism”,
remains very strong in foreign and security policy thinking in contemporary
Mongolia. A political debate in the 1990s centered on what kind of policy to
adopt with respect to the two neighbors: whether to:
1. Maintain an alliance or special relations with Russia, bearing in mind
Mongolia’s twentieth century history, national experience and still heavy eco-
nomic dependence on Russia; this option was rejected in light of recent experi-
ence, when during the Sino-Soviet confrontation between 1960 and mid 1980s
8  A.D. Smith, National Identity, London: Penguin Books, 1991, p. 14.
9  Unen, June 25, 1991
10  Ewing. Between The Hammer and Anvil?, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.1980.
11 Baabar B., (1999) Book Three. A Puppet Republic, History of Mongolia, Cambridge*
the White Horse Press,
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Soviet troops were stationed in Mongolia, which virtually became a hostage of
Sino-Soviet relations. Most of the outside world did not exist for Mongolia
because its foreign policy was entirely under Moscow’s command. Bearing in
mind experiences from the Sino-Soviet dispute, Mongolia also declared that in
case of future disputes between Russia and China, it would pursue a policy of
non-involvement and neutrality, unless the disputes affect its vital national
interests. In the latter case, the concept declared, Mongolia would follow its
vital interests.
2. to declare strict neutrality (like Switzerland, for example) This second
option was also rejected on the grounds that strict neutrality of a small, eco-
nomically weak, land-locked state, sandwiched between two major competing
powers would not hold because of its economic and political vulnerability to
outside pressure. Strict neutrality would require a degree of political and eco-
nomic weight that Mongolia does not possess.
3. To find some other suitable “prescription” that would take into ac-
count Mongolia’s geopolitical reality and the interests of its neighbors   without
compromising Mongolia’s own sovereignty. The concepts of a “multi-pillar
foreign policy” and a “balanced relationship” with regard to its powerful
neighbors emerged from this debate and was documented in the “Concept of
national security” in 1994. Maintaining a balanced relationship was not seen as
keeping equidistant between them or taking identical positions on all issues.
This policy meant strengthening trust and developing all-round good-neigh-
borly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation with both of them.
Current Foreign Minister L. Erdenechuluun stresses the insecurity and
disadvantage which Mongolia experiences. He wrote: “In case of Mongolia, as
with many other nations, its geographical location has a major bearing on the
entire spectrum of its foreign and domestic policies. A feature, however, that few
nations, if any, possess, is the fact that Mongolia is sandwiched between two
great powers, namely, the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of
China. Both are nuclear powers and sit on the United Nation’s Security Council
as its permanent members. Mongolia does not have direct access to the sea, and
this only adds to the disadvantage.” 12
Why do Mongols want to have a third partner or a third neighbor? An-
swers may vary. But the main logic is again political realism or Mongolian
“realpolitik”. Mongolian authors generally agree that because of the lack of
 12 Erdenechuluun L., (1999) Mongolia’s strategic options, Northeast Asia towards 2000:
Interdependence and Conflict? Kyongsoo Lho/ Kay Moller edited, Baden-Baden. Pp. 93.
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necessary political and economic weight to implement its declared national se-
curity policy, Mongolia needs a strong third power as a counterweight to bal-
ance its relations with the immediate neighbors.
In this respect, the view of L. Erdenechuluun is typical of Mongolian
thinking. He wrote “Trying to reduce the possibility of an unpredictable turn of
events that might affect their existence and security, small and weak countries
have often turned to third parties so as to balance their relations with immediate
neighbors. Whereas this has been true for Mongolia in principle, a single re-
gional player able to outweigh Russia and China can simply not be conceived of
in the foreseeable future. One might therefore not think of this neighbor in terms
of a single country, but rather as a group of countries, especially those which
have consistently supported democratic change in Mongolia.” 13
The current leadership of Mongolia is keen to invite investment and more
advanced technology from the Western countries and sees their involvement as
a form of protection for Mongolia’s future. PM N. Enkhbayar in his interview to
the Far Eastern Economic Review said that “ties with such countries will make
Mongolians feel more secure economically, technologically and even psycho-
logically.” 14
The Far Eastern Economic Review also wrote that “Worries about
Mongolia’s geographical isolation and fears about the intentions of its neigh-
bors, particularly China which is viewed with deep suspicion by many Mongo-
lians, have prompted Ulan Bator to follow a “multi-pillar” foreign policy aimed at
cementing ties with other countries. One of these pillars is military. Mongolia’s
small army has relations with a wide range of countries including China, Russia,
the U.S., South Korea, Japan, India and Germany. Last year it took part in a
peacekeeping training exercise in Kazakhstan that brought together troops from
Central Asia, Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Mongolia also
has a dialogue with NATO and, officials say, is ready if asked to send a small
contingent of troops to the United Nations operation in East Timor. These mili-
tary contacts, particularly with the U.S., annoy Beijing, officials say, but are all
part of a complex balancing act aimed at keeping Mongolia’s two powerful neigh-
bors at a distance.” 15
PM Enkhbayar during his recent visit to the U.S. (November 2001) deliv-
ered a speech titled ‘Mongolia’s contribution to the global fight against terror-
ism” at the United States Institute of Peace. Among other things he elaborated
13 Erdeneculuun B. (1999), pp. 95.
14 Far Eastern Economic Review May 31, 2001.
15 Ibid.
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on his geopolitical vision about future of Mongolia. He broadened the concept
of the third neighbor including not only Western countries but East Asian coun-
tries and even India. He talked about India as the third neighbor in cultural
sense, about Korea and Japan as the third neighbors in economic terms and
about the U.S. and the European Union as the third neighbors in strategic terms.
Enkhbayar’s background as a devout Buddhist is evident in his admiration of
India as the cultural and civilization friend for Mongolia. Mongolia’s search for
its third neighbor continues.
As Sherman Garnett wrote, “What many U.S. analysts regard as Asia’s
“backside” or even “backwater” is already becoming increasingly linked to lands
on Asia’s rim. Thus, areas once remote from U.S. strategic planning will have an
increasingly direct influence on areas of vital interest in East Asia and the Per-
sian Gulf’.16 After 9/11 the new U.S. presence in Central Asia has reinforced the
emerging post-Cold War reconnection of Central Asia with East Asia. Therefore,
a democratic and prosperous Mongolia, located strategically between two re-
gions, can play an important role as the link of stability between dynamic East
Asia and volatile Central Asia.
16 Rapprochement or Rivalry? Russia-China Relations in a changing Asia, Sherman W.
Garnett edited, Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 2000, pp. 34.
